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its founding by Ralph Nader in 1971, Public Citizen has been advocating for citizen and consumer justice, and
for governmental and corporate accountability.  Public Citizen unites thousands of ordinary citizens into one
powerful voice for the public interest that is heard in every public arena: the marketplace, the courts, national
and state governments, and the media.
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch leads the way in educating the American public about the enormous
impact of international trade and economic globalization on our jobs, the environment, public health and
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the environment, good jobs, and democratic decision-making, which are threatened by the so-called “free
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ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE IN THE ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: THE WTO, NAFTA, AND
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF STANDARDS
I.  INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, new international trade use to obtain even the allowed objectives. A core
and investment rules of unprecedented scope and provision of the WTO states: “Each Member shall
power, coupled with massive changes in business ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
practices and organization, have resulted in an administrative procedures with its obligations as
astonishing transformation of economic and social provided in the annexed Agreements.”
policy around the world.  This new arrangement is
often labeled “economic globalization.”  However, in NAFTA also contains provisions limiting certain
addition to its economic consequences, globalization national investment and economic development
has a major effect on domestic governance, and thus policies. For instance, NAFTA forbids governments
on public health, economic development, and social from establishing or maintaining some investment
and environmental policy. preferences to promote development in
NAFTA and the WTO  
Two major trade pacts intensified and  politically and
legally formalized the move toward globalization: the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
passed by Congress in 1993, and the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade NAFTA and  WTO provisions are based on certain
(GATT), passed in 1994.  The GATT Uruguay underlying premises, among them: domestic health,
Round established the World Trade Organization safety, and environmental policies must be designed
(WTO), a powerful new global commerce agency. in the “least trade restrictive” manner and national
Together, NAFTA and the WTO constitute internationally so as to maximize economic
permanent institutional structures which are efficiency in cross-border trade.  This process of
significant engines driving corporate economic global standardization has been dubbed
globalization. Both pacts contain numerous “harmonization” by the corporations that favor it.
provisions that go far beyond the usual purview of
trade agreements, which traditionally focused on NAFTA and the WTO provide powerful incentives
tariffs and quotas.  NAFTA and the WTO include for governments to harmonize standards and
provisions governing the domestic public health, food regulations even when they are not legally required
safety, consumer, worker and environmental to do so by the pacts. NAFTA and the WTO also
protection policies of member-countries.  These are set constraints on member countries’ domestic laws
all issues which traditionally have been at the core of by naming certain international standards as the
domestic policy-making. presumptively permissible ones, and by establishing
Both NAFTA and the WTO establish where non-conforming domestic laws can be
comprehensive international rules constraining the
domestic policy objectives member countries may
pursue, and what policy tools member countries may
1
impoverished or minority areas, as well as
investment conditioned on non-commercial
performance standards, such as environmental
performance.2
Mechanisms of Harmonization
laws and standards should be standardized
binding international dispute resolution processes
challenged. 
NAFTA and the WTO pressure member
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U.S. Regulations and Standards Covering These Topics Are Now Being
Affected by Harmonization
i Meat, Poultry, and Fish
Inspection
i Pesticides
i Pharmaceuticals i Organic Foods
i Telecommunications i Chemical Classification and Labeling
i Genetically-Modified Foods i Informational Labeling and Eco-Labeling
i Auto Safety i Aviation Safety
i Cosmetics i Endangered Species
i Electrical Safety i Electromagnetic Safety
i Shellfish Inspection i Veterinary Drugs
i Hazardous Waste Transportation i Electronic Commerce
i Medical Devices i Marine Recreational Craft
governments to base their domestic standard-making international standards are not yet completed, but
on specified international standards and on their completion is imminent.   As with food
international standard-setting techniques. One standards, under  NAFTA the WTO only technical
example is a requirement that countries “base their regulations conforming to international standards are
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (food presumed not to create unnecessary obstacles to
standards) on international standards, guidelines or trade.  
recommendations. . . .”   NAFTA contains similar3
requirements.  NAFTA and the WTOpermit Standards providing more protection to consumers
countries to have food safety measures that achieve or public health or local communities or the
a higher level of health protection than relevant environment can be challenged as unfair barriers to
international standards only in very limited trade before dispute resolution panels established by
circumstances. both NAFTA and the WTO to enforce their rules4
  over non-conforming domestic policies.  The
NAFTA and the WTO also direct countries to use acceptable reasons for exceeding international
a standard-setting technique called “risk standards in non-food areas under the WTO are
assessment.”   Yet, some U.S. standards are based strictly limited to fundamental climactic,
not on assessing a tolerable amount of risk (“risk geographical or technical inappropriateness.
assessment”), but in forbidding public exposure to a NAFTA's rules allowing exceptions that provide
risk altogether.  Such “zero tolerance” standards, more protection than international standards are only
while safer for consumers, are inherently slightly less restrictive.
problematic under NAFTA and WTO rules because
they are not developed using the internationally- Because domestic standards that do not conform to
recognized risk assessment method of standard- international standards must satisfy a battery of
setting under the pacts.  NAFTA or WTO tests in order to avoid being
Both agreements also require countries to base their falls on the country defending a stronger domestic
non-food technical standards on relevant health or environmental law.  Thus, the pacts create
international standards, even where such significant incentives for the U.S. to avoid
5
6
considered barriers to trade, the burden of proof
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exceeding international standards.  The threat of a are “equivalence determinations.”  Under the notion
costly NAFTA or WTO trade challenge may also of “equivalence,” significantly different - and
chill innovative solutions to consumer and worker possibly less protective - regulatory systems and
health and safety,  environmental, labor rights, or standards  in other countries can be declared
other social or economic development problems. “equivalent” to domestic regulatory systems.  Once
Types of Harmonization
There are two primary types of harmonization
promoted by NAFTA and the WTO: global
standard setting, which takes place in international
standard-setting institutions, and equivalency
agreements, which are usually bi-lateral agreements
between two nations. Mutual Recognition
Agreements, bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements
between nations, can be a vehicle for both types of
harmonization.
Global Standard Setting: NAFTA and the WTO
name specific international standards, such as those
established by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) in Geneva and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) in Rome as
presumptively complying with trade rules.   Both the7
ISO and Codex are dominated by industry.  Indeed,
ISO, which sets product and manufacturing process
standards, is a private sector organization, funded by
industry and largely comprised of industry
representatives. Codex, which sets food standards
under the auspices of several United Nations-related
organizations, consists of governmental
representatives, but operates with an important
formal role for industry. Citizen input in both is
essentially non-existent, as is meaningful
participation by health or consumer groups.
Currently, the U.S. is involved in international
harmonization in the areas of genetically modified
foods, meat and poultry inspection, medical devices,
pharmaceuticals, chemical classification and labeling,
pesticide residue levels, veterinary drugs, and
automobile and aviation safety regulations, (just to
name a few areas).  These activities are being
conducted in a diverse array of international
standards organizations, industry associations, and
inter-governmental fora. 
Equivalency: In addition to the adoption of uniform
international standards, another mechanism of
harmonization required by NAFTA and WTO rules
a foreign system is declared “equivalent,” it must be
treated as if it were a domestic system, even if it
differs from the domestic system in significant
ways.  Equivalence determinations are designed to
allow foreign goods produced under “equivalent”
systems free passage into the U.S. market.
The U.S. is in the process of determining
equivalency between the U.S. and European Union
(EU) member states in the area of manufacturing
practices for pharmaceuticals. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has already
approved 32 meat inspection systems around the
world as equivalent to our own and participates in a
wide-ranging equivalency agreement with the EU
on veterinary practices and medicines.
NAFTA and WTO rules mandate equivalence
determinations but do not provide procedural
guidelines or factors to consider.  The absence of
such guidelines and factors has resulted in
subjective comparisons.  Under these NAFTA and
WTO rules, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand how countries, including the U.S.,  will
fulfill the requirement to determine whether the
regulatory systems of dozens of other countries are
equivalent to their own.
Mutual Recognition Agreements: Another tool
in the international harmonization kit is the Mutual
Recognition Agreement (MRA). A MRA is a
negotiated, reciprocal agreement between nations
which allows one nation to rely on the other’s
“conformity assessment” system. 
“Conformity assessment” means verification by a
country that a product meets a required standard.
Thus conformity assessment systems include
product testing, quality systems audits, and the
reporting required from such testing or audits. For
example, an MRA the U.S. is currently engaged in
would allow foreign drug regulatory authorities to
conduct inspections of that country’s drug
manufacturers on behalf of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to ensure they meet the
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requirements of U.S. law. The FDA will accept
these inspection reports as if they had been
produced by U.S. regulators.  
The U.S. is currently participating in a MRA with
the EU covering electromagnetic safety,
telecommunications, marine recreational craft,
electrical safety, medical devices, and
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
Another MRA with Canada on molluscan shellfish
regulation is in the works.
Industry documents are unabashed in describing that
MRAs are intended by industry to be a vehicle for
standards harmonization and  equivalency, not just
conformity assessment. The U.S.-EU MRA on
pharmaceuticals, for example, necessitates the
determination of equivalency between the nations
involved regarding good manufacturing practices,
which ensure the purity and quality of the final drug
product.
Harmonization Upward or Downward?
Theoretically, international harmonization could
occur at the lowest or highest levels of public health
or environmental protection or somewhere in
between.  Unfortunately, the actual provisions in
NAFTA and the WTO requiring harmonization or
providing incentives for harmonization could result in
the lowering of the best existing domestic public
health, social, economic justice, natural resource
conservation and environmental standards around
the world. 
For instance, under  NAFTA and the WTO,
international standards  serve as a ceiling which
countries cannot exceed rather than as a floor that
all countries must meet. The agreements provide for
the challenge of any domestic standards that go
beyond international standards in providing greater
citizen safeguards, but contain no provisions for
challenging standards that fall below the named
international standard. Thus, the provisions in
NAFTA and the WTO promoting harmonization are
likely to serve only as a one-way downward ratchet
on domestic standards. Challenges of domestic
standards that exceed international standards will be
resolved in the binding dispute resolution system built
into these agreements.
Dispute Resolution Process  
While similar in some ways to a judicial proceeding,
the dispute resolution systems in NAFTA and the
WTO lack the procedural safeguards inherent in the
U.S. judicial system.  Cases are decided by tribunals
comprised of three trade experts.  Tribunalists are
chosen on the basis of a list of qualifications that
ensure that panelists will have a favorable view of
current trade rules and the dominance of NAFTA
and WTO rules over other domestic policies.   (For8
instance, to qualify for a WTO tribunal a person
must have worked at the GATT or WTO or
represented a country there, with very limited
exceptions.)   Tribunalists are not required to9
disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest, nor
are the tribunals required to follow other due
process standards. 
The dispute resolution process in both NAFTA and
the WTO is secretive; documents are confidential;
oral arguments are closed to observation or
participation by any entities except national
government representatives; and no outside appeal
is available.   Nor is there any mechanism for10
nongovernmental entities or other outsiders to
submit amicus briefs.   A recent WTO ruling11
announced that such submissions are not absolutely
forbidden, but can only be accepted if they are
submitted as part of an involved government’s
documents.   State, federal or local laws and12
regulations judged to be out of compliance with
NAFTA or the WTO must be eliminated or
changed, or the “winning” country can place trade
sanctions on products from the country whose law
is ruled against.
Expansive international rules strongly enforced
through international dispute resolution bodies have
significant implications for the laws and policies
domestic governments may establish, as well as for
the processes domestic governments use to make
policy.  Yet, while the WTO and NAFTA establish
an entire system of international governance, the
two agreements were designed to promote narrow
economic goals, such as freeing investment flows
from government policies seeking to shape
economic development, and expanding the volume
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of international trade.  follow different procedures for involving the public
Other valuable goals, such as the promotion of make differing amounts of information available to
democratic accountability, just economic distribution, the public at different stages.  In a manner both
strong communities, and consumer, public health and subtle and powerful, recent international commercial
environmental protection were not included. Indeed, agreements such as the WTO and NAFTA have
the pacts contain provisions to limit countervailing redefined the relationships in policy-making between
policy goals to the extent they could impact trade governments, industry, and the diffuse public
and investment flows. 
Implications for Democracy
Under NAFTA and the WTO, international NAFTA and the WTO’s  systematic prioritization of
standards developed in industry-only standard-setting commerce over all other policy goals was possible
institutions that are closed to government or public because the negotiation and adoption of both
participation or outside scrutiny or input have the NAFTA and the WTO largely foreclosed citizen
same status as standards developed by wholly and public interest group participation. The
governmental institutions or  quasi-governmental agreements were negotiated behind closed doors
standard-setting institutions. between unelected and largely unaccountable
Standard-setting bodies recognized by NAFTA and the U.S. Trade Representative  and U.S.
the WTO operate with widely differing membership, Department of the Commerce.
decision-making structures, and rules about
transparency. In many, members of the public or Under uniquely constricting procedural rules called
public interest groups have no standing, can be “Fast Track,” Congress’ role in the development of
refused a seat at the table and denied access to NAFTA and the WTO was also very limited.
documents. Yet, because of NAFTA and WTO During negotiations of the pacts, consultation with
requirements, the international standards set in these Congress was minimal. Once completed,
institutions have the same compelling implications for Congressional approval of the pacts and the
existing domestic standards and the ability of thousands of pages of changes to U.S. law required
interested parties to have future standards to conform to the pacts’ terms by a simple majority
developed. was required within 90 days.  Uniquely, under Fast
In sharp contrast to the closed door process of many implementing legislation.  Under Fast Track's
standard setting institutions, U.S., policy-making uniquely restrictive procedural requirements, only 30
must be conducted “on the record,” with a publicly hours of Congressional debate is allowed and the
accessible docket, under laws such as the federal vote must occur without any amendments to the
Administrative Procedure Act. Public access to lengthy implementing legislation.  As a result, few
information and decision-making is also guaranteed Representatives were well-informed about the
in U.S. domestic law by the Freedom of Information pacts’ requirements.
Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act and the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA Documents, draft texts and negotiations on NAFTA
requires balanced representation on and open and the WTO were inaccessible to the public.  Even
operations of government advisory committees. Members of Congress were largely limited to
For international harmonization of standards, texts were only available to Members of Congress
however, agency adherence to the U.S. domestic at certain times and under certain conditions. Only
procedures for notice, balance, openness, and public staff with security clearance were allowed access
input has been spotty at best. U.S. federal agencies to such documents at all.
in their international harmonization negotiations  and
interest.
The Origins of NAFTA and the WTO 
government agents, such as staff of the Office of
Track the Executive Branch writes trade agreement
information provided by negotiators. Actual draft
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At the same time, industry had extensive access to environmental representatives were included on
information and the opportunity to provide input into these committees.
the negotiations through an official trade advisory
committee system. The U.S. trade advisory system The constricted and one-sided access to
includes more than three dozen committees with information, the lack of a full public debate and the
over 800 industry representatives who have access constraints placed by Fast Track on the normal
to inside information and provide advice on most democratic process, virtually guaranteed that these
aspects of negotiation and implementation of trade important trade pacts would be unbalanced and thus
agreements and policies.   During the negotiation of would cause significant problems when13
the WTO and NAFTA, a dozen labor implemented.
representatives, but no health, consumer, or
II. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES
Numerous harmonization negotiations are currently Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) in Rome
underway.  Both NAFTA and the WTO established is one of the international standard-setting bodies
new committees to develop uniform international recognized by both NAFTA and the WTO for
standards and to promote harmonization of domestic setting global food standards. It was established as
food safety and technical standards, which include a voluntary standard-setting body in 1962 by the
all non-food standards such as those pertaining to World Health Organization and the U.N. Food and
natural resources, product safety, or automobile Agriculture Organization, primarily to facilitate
pollution.  NAFTA also established numerous international trade of food and agriculture products.
committees to harmonize auto, truck and highway Codex’s initial mission was to boost trade by helping
safety and hazardous transportation rules,  and both developing countries set food-related standards.14
agreements set up harmonization committees for Soon, numerous agribusiness, chemical, and food
banking, insurance and other services sectors. companies sought a role at Codex. Codex is
Under NAFTA and the WTO, specific international with active and formal assistance from official
standard-setting bodies, such as the ISO and Codex, industry advisors, who serve as actual members on
are given the task of setting presumptively- country delegations.   
permissible global standards. NAFTA and WTO
provisions obligate member countries to participate Food industry giants, such as Hershey Foods, Nestle
in harmonization talks in these fora. U.S.A., Kraft, General Foods, Coca Cola, and
It does not matter whether these negotiations take Manufacturers of America and the National Food
place in private, industry-funded standard-setting Processors Association, regularly attend
organizations like the ISO or quasi-governmental international Codex meetings as part of the official
bodies like the Codex. NAFTA and the WTO do not U.S. delegation.  These industries also have a
mandate any procedural safeguards requiring central role in developing the U.S. positions taken to
openness or transparency.  The sole criterion for such meetings, including providing scientific data
NAFTA and WTO compliance is whether the and scientists. A 1993 study showed that over four-
standard is set in an international body.  Below are fifths of the nongovernmental participants on all
two examples of these international standard-setting delegations to Codex committees represented
bodies. industry, while only one percent represented public
A. The Codex Alimentarius
Commission and Food Safety Standards
“Codex Alimentarius” is Latin for food law.  The
officially comprised of government representatives,
15
Pepsi, and trade groups, such as the Grocery
interest organizations.16
Until it was empowered by both NAFTA and the
WTO as the presumptively-legal international food
standard body, Codex published only voluntary
Public Citizen        Harmonization Handbook
standards for the hygienic and nutritional quality of residue levels that are five times higher than U.S.
food, food additives, pesticide residues, standards.   In addition, some Codex standards
contaminants, labeling, and methods of analysis and allow pesticide residues that are banned in certain
sampling. Despite its important new duties, Codex’s U.S. states.   
mission is still to promote food trade.  Codex has no
public health mandate to which it must conform its Given that some of Codex’s standards are lower
decisions.  It even lacks power to compel production than U.S. norms and that they now are empowered
of data from industry for standard-setting. through NAFTA and the WTO, downward
Codex holds meetings which are closed to the possibility. Alternatively, another country may
general public. Draft Codex standards are not made simply challenge higher U.S. food standards using
public until well into the process. In order to provide NAFTA or the WTO’s dispute settlement process.
input, members of the public must persuade a To avoid such WTO challenges, for example, Japan
governmental participant to present their positions. preemptively lowered over 1500 of its domestic
Thanks to efforts by Public Citizen and others, health protections than Codex standards.
internationally incorporated public interest
organizations can now petition to attend Codex For more information on Codex, see the Codex
meetings as observers.   However, Codex’s design Internet site at http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/17
is typical of international standard-setting bodies ECONOMIC/esn/codex/default.htm, or the U.S.
named in NAFTA and the WTO. Unlike U.S. Codex Office Internet site at http://www.fsis.usda.
standard-setting, where meaningful participation is gov/oa/Codex/index.htm.
possible thanks to a centralized process, Codex
meetings are held around the world.  Thus, effective
participation in the creation of any individual
standard requires an interested party to provide the
proper scientific or policy expert for each of
numerous working groups, committees, and experts'
groups all of which meet regularly in different
locations around the world.  
This is in contrast to U.S. systems of accountable,
democratic governance, where the role of
government is to provide scientific expertise and
accessible locations for obtaining comprehensive
information and submitting policy input.  Codex’s
design and processes ensure that even when
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are admitted
to meetings, meaningful public interest participation
is all but impossible.
A significant number of Codex standards are
weaker than food standards in the U.S., which by
law must be established using public health
considerations.  For example, some Codex standards
allow residues of pesticides that have been banned
in the U.S.   Others allow higher residues than are18
permitted in the U.S. for pesticides such as
heptachlor, aldrin, diazinon, lindane, permethrin, and
benomyl.   In some cases, Codex standards allow19
20
21
harmonization of U.S. food standards is a clear
pesticide standards which provided greater public
22
B. International Organization for
Standardization 
The International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) in Geneva is a private, industry standard-
setting body.  The ISO has been recognized by both
NAFTA and the WTO as the presumptively-legal
international standard setter for all non-food
products. 
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Some International Harmonization Fora
Codex Alimentarius Commission Food Safety, Pesticides, GMOs
Cosmetics Harmonization & International Cooperation Cosmetics
Global Harmonization Task Force Medical Devices
International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Materials
International Civil Aviation Organization Aviation Safety
International Conference on Harmonization Pharmaceuticals
International Labor Organization Chemical Hazard Labeling
International Organization for Standardization Products, Eco-Labels, Enviro. Services
NAFTA Technical Working Groups Food Safety, Pesticides
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development GMOs, Chemical Classification
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Auto Safety
Veterinary International Cooperation on Harmonization Veterinary Drugs
When the ISO started in the 1950s, its goal was to firms.”   The ISO “has belatedly invited delegates
standardize sizes for light bulbs, screws, batteries, from governments and citizen’s groups; but has
and other consumer products to help industry expand used this invitation, and the limited participation that
markets.  In the past decade, however, the ISO’s ensued, to claim an openness while ignoring their
areas of interest have expanded to include standards substantive input.”   The report also notes,
for environmental products, eco-labels, and humane “Decision-making in ISO is by member associations
fur trapping standards.  The ISO is now nearing and firms.  Other participants, while they may be
completion of additional standards, called the “ISO invited and are recorded as ‘participants’ in a
14000 series,” that focus on management practices, ‘consensual’ decision-making process, do not have
including providing a best “environmental practice” voting rights.”
seal.  To date, these proposals do not actually
include requirements that environmental quality One of the questions posed in this NGO report is
industry-set standards be measured with whether ISO 14001 can become an international
performance requirements. trade standard enforced by NAFTA and the WTO
The ISO’s recent expansion into these new issues NGOs?  The report concludes that the answer is,
has begun to concern some environmental, animal “Yes,” under current trade rules, these standards
welfare, and consumer groups who have tried to would have status regardless of the process by
participate in the ISO process. Unfortunately, the which they were set.
ISO is designed in a manner that makes meaningful
non-profit group participation impossible. For more information on the ISO and international
According to a report for the Brussels-based http://www.iso.ch, or the American National
European Environment Bureau, the ISO’s standards Standards Institute (ANSI), the U.S. member of
drafting committee is “made up principally of ISO, at http://www.ansi.org.
executives from large international corporations,
national standards-setting firms and consulting
23
24
25
without operative participation from governments or
26
standards, see the ISO Internet site at
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III. WTO AND NAFTA TRIBUNALS ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS AND CONSTRICT DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY
Both NAFTA and the WTO require countries to and premature pubescence in girls,  although the
base their environmental, food safety, public health, risk to humans of artificial hormone residues in the
and worker safety standards on international meat they consume is uncertain.
standards.   And both agreements stand ready to27
enforce the international standard through their On the basis of the known risks of direct exposure
powerful dispute resolution systems. and the public’s demand for a ban on meat from
Following is an example of a WTO case which adopted a “zero risk” standard.  Rather than trying
illustrates the implications of the WTO’s reliance on to assess a tolerable amount of an indeterminable
and enforcement of international standards. The so- risk or waiting for negative human health effects to
called U.S.-EU “beef hormone” case, brought to the accrue over time, the EU chose to eliminate public
WTO by the U.S. in 1996, is still causing friction exposure to the risk altogether.  The EU made this
between the nations.  The EU is currently paying policy choice after prolonged and effective
punitive tariffs worth $116 million after losing this consumer campaigns in numerous EU countries.
case in the WTO. Also discussed is a NAFTA
dispute resolution case in which a Canadian The U.S. beef and biotechnology industries have
corporation is challenging a California environmental long opposed this EU policy,  and in 1996 the U.S.
law banning a certain type of reformulated gasoline challenged the EU ban in the WTO.   In 1997, a
produced by the company. NAFTA dispute WTO dispute panel ruled that the EU ban was
resolution rules contain an extreme provision that illegal under the WTO’s food rules, contained in the
allows companies to directly sue governments for Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
cash compensation for regulations that affect a Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), in part
company’s profits.  This NAFTA case demonstrates because the EU ban was not based on international
how the dispute resolution system can chill the standards.   At that time, Codex rules allowed use
development of more health-protective sub-federal of the artificial hormones and set residue levels for
laws. five of the six hormones at issue.
For more information on WTO agreements, the A key argument centered around the meaning of the
WTO dispute resolution system, and WTO cases, term “based on international standards,” a
see http://www.wto.org.  For more information on requirement in the SPS Agreement.  The dispute
NAFTA agreements, see http://www.sice.oas.org/ panel ruled that “based on” meant “complied with,”
default.asp.  For more information on pending which essentially meant that all domestic standards
NAFTA cases, see the International Center for had to be the same as international standards.  Since
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) site at the EU ban covered five hormones for which Codex
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm. had set maximum residue levels, the dispute panel
 ruled that the EU measures were not “based on”
A.  WTO Enforces International Standards
in Beef Hormone Case
Since 1988, the European Union (EU) has banned
the sale of beef from cattle treated with artificial
growth hormones.  The EU ban applies in a non-
discriminatory fashion to both domestic and foreign
beef producers.   Exposure to the artificial28
hormones themselves have been linked to cancer
29
cattle treated with artificial hormones, the EU
30
31
32
international standards.  And since the EU
measures were not based on international standards,
under WTO rules they would be considered illegal
trade barriers unless the EU could bear the burden
of proving that its measures met a long set of tests
set forth in the WTO text, including that the ban
was “scientifically justified.” 
The dispute panel ruled, “Since in this dispute we
have already found that there exist international
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standards and that the EC measures at issue are not
based on these standards, we find that the burden of
justifying the measures in dispute under Article 3.3
. . . rests on the European Communities.”   Article33
3.3 of the SPS Agreement requires domestic
standards that provide more consumer protection
than international standards, among other conditions,
to be based on a scientific risk assessment.   The34
dispute panel concluded that the EU had not done a
proper risk assessment and ruled the ban on
hormones an illegal barrier to trade.35
The EU appealed this decision to the WTO
Appellate Body.  Although the Appellate Body
softened the harsh tone of the language in the
dispute panel’s opinion, it still upheld the panel’s final
decision and ordered the EU to begin importing U.S.
artificial hormone-treated beef by May 13, 1999.36
However, the EU refused to import the hormone-
treated beef and commissioned the EU Scientific
Committee on Veterinary Matters Related to Public
Health to study the health effects of the hormones.37
The U.S. petitioned the WTO dispute panel for
permission to impose sanctions on $202 million of
EU exports, but the panel lowered that figure to
$116.8 million.38
The EU scientific committee found that one of the
six artificial growth hormones used by U.S.
cattlemen, 17 beta oestradiol, may cause cancer.
The European Commission then issued a statement
declaring, “The Commission agreed that there can
no longer be any question of lifting the ban on
hormone-treated beef since the risk assessment has
identified risks to health caused by hormones.”   39
As of June 2000, the EU has not lifted the ban on
hormone-treated beef, and is paying millions of
dollars worth of sanctions to the U.S. on a variety of
products.  Thus, U.S. consumers face higher prices
on a variety of goods imported from Europe.  The
only relief U.S. consumers could obtain from these
raised prices would come at the cost of EU
consumers’ exposure to artificial hormone residues
in their beef.
B.  NAFTA Rules Restrict California’s law to be a “regulatory taking,” as claimed by
State Sovereignty
When the U.S. Congress passed the North
American Free Trade Agreement in 1993,
consumer, environmental, and other groups
condemned the agreement in part for provisions that
empower corporations to demand compensation
from NAFTA governments for costs incurred in
complying with laws protective of the environment
and public health.  Specifically, NAFTA’s Chapter
11 “Expropriation and Compensation” provisions
allow private investors to sue NAFTA nations
directly in international dispute tribunals for cash
compensation for government actions judged by the
tribunal to undermine an investor’s future
profitability.  Chapter 11 guarantees foreign
investors compensation from NAFTA nation
governments for any government action
“tantamount to” an “indirect expropriation.”40
These provisions have been widely criticized as
establishing a broad “regulatory takings”
mechanism.
The power of these provisions was most recently
demonstrated when the Canadian corporation
Methanex used them to sue the U.S. government
for $970 million after California banned methyl
tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). MTBE is a gasoline
additive designed to reduce harmful air emissions.
But the chemical also has been classified as a
possible human carcinogen and has been found in
water supplies in California, a state in which it was
being used as a gas additive. 
State environmental officials concluded that the
groundwater contamination was being caused by
leaks in gas storage tanks.  On March 25, 1999,
California, by order of the governor, required the
removal of MTBE from gasoline sold in the state by
December 31, 2002.  California Governor Gray
Davis declared that “on balance, there is significant
risk to the environment from using MTBE in
gasoline in California.”41
Methanex, the company producing MTBE, claims
that California’s ban on MTBE violates NAFTA’s
Chapter 11 provisions by limiting the corporation’s
ability to sell MTBE.  If a NAFTA tribunal finds the
Methanex, the U.S. government can be held liable
for the corporation’s lost profits.
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U.S. scientists have associated the chemical with placing our limited water resources at risk by using
human neurotoxicological effects, such as dizziness, MTBE.”
nausea, and headaches, and also consider it to be an
animal carcinogen with the potential to cause human Methanex claims that MTBE provides cleaner air.
cancer.   The International Agency for Research However, the U.C.-Davis report found that “there42
on Cancer (IARC), a body under the World Health is no significant additional air quality benefit to the
Organization, claims that not enough data exists to use of oxygenates such as MTBE in reformulated
classify MTBE as a human carcinogen, even though gasoline . . . .”   The report also found no
it has listed MTBE as an animal carcinogen.   It is economic benefit from the use of MTBE.  In43
unclear whether Methanex is using the IARC data comparing the costs of gas with MTBE added to
in its argument since in NAFTA Chapter 11 gas with ethanol and gas without any oxygenate
challenges the briefs of the parties are not publicly added, the report concluded that MTBE gas “has
available. the highest net annual cost due primarily to the costs
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prices, and lower fuel efficiency.”
has classified MTBE as a “possible” human
carcinogen and is considering banning or limiting  the Critics have accused Methanex of using NAFTA to
use of MTBE in gasoline.   The EPA has also override the priorities and judgements of the44
determined that “[l]ow levels of MTBE can render Governor, State Senate, and people of California.
drinking water supplies unpotable due to its offensive Ironically, the state of California will not even have
taste and odor.” a voice in the NAFTA case because NAFTA rules45
The California ban is based on a 1998 University of government of the country being sued to be
California-Davis report which found, “There are represented.   While the case is still pending,  it is
significant risks and costs associated with water being watched closely by many members of the
contamination due to the use of MTBE.”   The U.S. Congress, including those who supported46
report noted, “MTBE is highly soluble in water and NAFTA, as a test of NAFTA’s ability to undermine
will transfer readily to groundwater from gasoline the democratic process and the resulting public
leaking from underground storage tanks, pipelines health and environmental legislation.
and other components of the gasoline distribution
system.”   The report also found that the use of For more information on MTBE and its effects, see47
MTBE gas in motor boats results in contamination of the University of California at Davis MTBE report
surface water.  The report concluded, “We are on the Internet at http://tsrtp.ucdavis.edu.mtberpt.
48
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of treating contaminated water supplies, higher fuel
51
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permit only the corporation and the federal
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION POSES CHALLENGES TO
DEMOCRATIC RULEMAKING AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
In sharp contrast to the functioning of most when issuing a final rule,  to describe in writing how
international standard setting bodies, U.S. law and why it made its decisions and on what basis it
requires that the public be notified and offered an rejected other options.
opportunity to comment on regulatory proposals.
Agency rulemaking must be conducted “on the Public access to information about and participation
record” under the Administrative Procedure Act in agency decision-making is facilitated by the
(APA),  which includes a process for advance Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),  which54
notice about proposed regulations, opportunities for permits individual citizens to get copies of
public comment, and open review of draft government documents; the Government in the
regulations.  The APA also requires an agency, Sunshine Act,  which ensures that important
55
56
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agency meetings are publicly noticed; and the providing the public an opportunity for comment on
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),  which the Codex standards under consideration or planned57
requires balanced representation on—and open for consideration.  The procedure states that the
operations of—government advisory committees. U.S. delegate will “take into account” all comments
These laws provide opportunities for the public to received but “will not be bound to agree with any
monitor and participate in domestic policy-making. comment.”
Public notices of policy-making initiatives are listed
in the Federal Register, which is easily accessible This proposed procedure has a variety of significant
at many public libraries and on the Internet. flaws.  First, the proposal lacks a statement of the
The open government laws described above are key delegation in their activities.  Such principles should
aspects of our U.S. policy-making procedures and include a commitment that the U.S. will participate
guarantee that U.S. citizens have a voice in the only in upward harmonization, and that transparency
development of rules and regulations that may and public involvement in the process are required.
intimately impact their lives.  However, with the
international harmonization of environmental, health, Second, the USDA’s proposal for obtaining public
safety, and other regulatory standards, these four input is far too casual to ensure meaningful
laws are being inadequately applied or stretched to participation. The proposal states that “the U. S.
accommodate activities that were not even delegate may solicit comments as deemed
contemplated when the laws were developed.  The appropriate.”  Yet there is a complicated multi-step
result is a greatly reduced level of citizen and public process for the finalization of Codex standards.
interest group  involvement in the process. Public comment may be needed at each stage, yet
In February 1998, the USDA published a procedure systematic input. In addition, leaving the solicitation
for accepting public comment on its activities in the for comments up to the discretion of the U.S. Codex
Codex.  This USDA policy is worth examining for its delegate is inappropriate. Different delegates may
casual treatment of public input. The procedure was have different views about when and which Codex
outlined in a Federal Register notice and request for papers should be offered for comment.
comments.  The notice described the duties of the58
U.S. delegate to the Codex and outlined the Third, the vague statement that USDA will “take
procedures delegate would follow in developing U.S. into account” comments received, coupled with the
positions on Codex matters, how the delegate would fact that the Codex delegation rarely, if ever,
involve the public in the development of those responds to public comments in writing, compounds
positions and select members to be part of the U.S. the problem.  The APA seeks to force agencies to
delegations to important Codex meetings. put their reasoning on the record so that consumers
Per the requirements of the Uruguay Round comment on agency decision-making.  As in the
Agreements Act  (the implementing legislation for domestic arena, in the international context, the59
U.S. participation in WTO agreements), the USDA agency must request comments at each decision
procedure states that the U.S. delegate to the Codex point and respond on the record, making clear to all
will post in the Federal Register an annual notice the parameters of their negotiation position.  This
listing: a) each standard under consideration or process would ensure that the U.S. public can have
planned for consideration; b) a description of the input into the governments negotiating position
standard; c) whether or not the U.S. plans to before U.S. negotiators go overseas, and that the
participate in the consideration; d) the agenda for the U.S. Codex delegation can be held accountable for
U.S. participation; and e) the federal agency their actions overseas by those who will live with
responsible for representing the U.S. in the the results.
development of the standard.  
The USDA procedure also commits the agency to proposal says that U.S. government positions should
overall goals or principles to guide the U.S. Codex
the proposal includes no requirements to seek such
and other interested parties can evaluate and
Fourth, the USDA’s Codex public participation
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be “based on sound science and take into account policy formation. In addition, to be qualified simply
U.S. statutes, regulations and policy.”  This to observe, an organization must be incorporated
statement suggests that the U.S. Codex delegation internationally, adding an undesired level of
does not feel bound by U.S. law or policy in Codex complexity and expense to the operations of public
negotiations.  Therefore it is not surprising that at a interest organizations seeking merely to observe.
July 1999 Codex meeting, the U.S. Codex delegation
failed to block the development of a Codex standard The USDA’s Codex procedure explicitly rules out
on pesticides that does not take into account the the possibility of funding for public interest delegates
specific effects of pesticides on children, as required or observers who, for example, might not be able to
by U.S. law.   afford regular flights to Chiba, Japan, where Codex60
The fact that the U.S. Codex delegation acceded to place.  As a consequence, while industry is well-
the development of an international pesticide represented at Codex meetings around the world,
standard that could put the higher, pro-child health consumer representatives are rarely invited or able
U.S. standard at risk if challenged as a trade barrier to attend.
in the WTO raises troubling questions about the
parameters in which the U.S. negotiators work. Recently, the U.S. delegate to the Codex has started
Many consumer advocates believe that, at a to post many Codex documents on its web-page
minimum, in harmonization negotiations U.S. law and has held more frequent public meetings.
should be a negotiating floor which U.S. negotiators However, much more must be done to ensure that
may improve upon, but are forbidden to fall below. concerned citizens and public interest groups have
Finally, the proposal does not provide any guarantee U.S. positions to the Codex and in the Codex itself.
that a Codex delegation will provide balanced
representation of government, industry, and For more information on upcoming Codex meetings,
consumers. Unless they are part of the U.S. see the FSIS Codex Internet site at
delegation, public interest groups can only attend as http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/meeting.htm.
observers, cannot vote and have no formal role in
discussions of genetically modified foods have taken
61
meaningful, substantive input into the formation of
V. WHEN HARMONIZATION IS INAPPROPRIATE
While voluntary harmonization can be useful for cultural circumstance. For instance, setting an
setting uniform product standards (i.e. standardizing allowable limit for pesticide residues on a
the size of computer disks and credit cards), commodity such as rice requires consideration of
unlimited harmonization is conceptually troublesome actual intake levels for consumers -- which would
for several reasons. vary enormously between consumers in the U.S.,
First, a core notion underlying harmonization is that
a uniform global standard that is appropriate for Second, harmonization moves decision-making away
numerous different cultures and suitable to the from accessible, accountable state and national
world's variety of social norms can always be governance fora to international bodies that are
established. Yet, standard setting is based on largely inaccessible to citizens and generally operate
numerous, diverse considerations, not the least of without accountability to those who must live with
which is the extent to which people (generally people their decisions. Yet, standard-setting requires not
in a particular country or subfederal region) choose only scientific knowledge, but also subjective policy
to be exposed to a particular risk. As well, setting decisions about the level of risk a society is willing
relevant standards requires consideration of to accept. The corrosive effect on democratic
objective data that will differ with geographic and accountability of shifting decision-making to
Asia, and Latin America. 
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inaccessible venues almost guarantees some level of Precautionary Principle should be incorporated more
industry capture, and thus increases the possibility of broadly in the international standards-setting
the development of weaker standards. process.  The Precautionary Principle is the legal
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) has always provide the evidence necessary to avert
considered these issues in developing policies and environmental or public health threats in a timely
procedures for dealing with harmonization.  The manner, and encourages regulators to err on the
TACD consists of 65 U.S. and European consumer side of safety when faced with uncertain scientific
groups representing some 600 million consumers. evidence or great potential risks to public health. 
The TACD was formed in 1998 to formalize U.S.
and EU consumer group cooperation and input to the The recent debates over the safety and long term
U.S. and EU governments on a range of effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
international commerce and other issues. and foods illustrate the importance of setting a
In February 2000, the TACD developed a paper slowly and cautiously when regulating products like
entitled “Principles of Harmonization” that lists the GMOs whose long term effects on the environment
group’s recommendations for when and how and public health remain unclear.
governments should participate in international
harmonization activities. The paper recommends The use of the Precautionary Principle is a
that: (1) standards that do not have a health and controversial issue between the U.S. and EU
safety component should be the primary candidates especially with regard to the regulation of
for international harmonization; (2) international genetically modified foods. The EU favors adding
standards should be used as a floor rather than a the Principle to Codex rules, while the U.S. argues
ceiling for consumer and environmental protection; that countries will use the Principle to restrict food
(3) governments should only recognize or be imports based on non-scientific factors.
involved in international harmonization activities
negotiated in open, accountable, democratic fora The Codex debate over the Precautionary Principle
with clear avenues for public input and transparent is not an academic one.  Unless and until major
methods of rulemaking and record keeping; and (4) changes are made to international agreements like
governments should reject the notion of “functional NAFTA and the WTO, the definition and scope of
equivalence,” which allows governments to the Precautionary Principle, agreed to in
recognize different, and often less protective, international standard-setting bodies, may be the
standards of other nations as equal to their own. most effective tool to defend precautionary public
The TACD paper also recommended that the from successful challenges as unfair barriers to
principle that acknowledges that science does not
definition of precaution that allows nations to move
health, product safety, and environmental standards
trade.
VI. EXAMPLES OF HARMONIZATION'S POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Harmonization is now under way on a wide range of On June 1, 1999, the USDA’s Food Safety and
standards, regulations, and regulatory systems - Inspection Service (FSIS) announced that it had
from meat and poultry inspection to automobile determined Australia’s new Meat Safety
safety and pesticide regulations.  Following are Enhancement Program (MSEP) to be equivalent to
several examples of cases now under consideration the U.S. government’s system.   Under Australia’s
for harmonization, with potential implications for an new program, Australian meat processors’ own
array of domestic standards. employees will perform inspections, with the
A.  Company Meat Inspection Equivalent
to  Government Meat Inspection?
62
oversight of government inspectors.  In comparison,
U.S. law requires government inspectors to examine
each animal carcass.63
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The MSEP was first introduced in Australia in 1997.
The first year it was in place, according to the
Australian Department of Health, salmonella
poisonings in Australia increased twenty percent
from the previous year, from 5,819 cases to 7,004.64
In 1998, the number of salmonella poisonings
jumped again, to 7,700 cases.   In 1999, the number65
of poisonings dropped to 7,182, but that is still a
twenty-three percent increase in the number of
salmonella poisonings in the first three years of the
company inspection program.  66
The same Australian system found equivalent by the
USDA was rejected by the European Commission
(EC).  After inspecting Australian meat
establishments in April, 1998, the EC’s Health &
Consumer Protection Directorate General (DG 24)
found that “veterinary supervision was generally
weak; [and] no initiatives were taken for correction
of deficiencies.”   After another such inspection in67
November 1999, DG 24 officials concluded, “In
many instances, the Australian quality assurance
systems permit establishment employees to act as if
they were officers of the competent authority.  This
is in breach of the requirement that inspectors
should enjoy a status which guarantees their
impartiality.  The level of official supervision and
control is reduced to a level below that required by
the EC legislation and must therefore be considered
inadequate.”68
Company-inspected meat, if produced in the U.S.,
would be condemned under the applicable U.S. law,
the Wholesome Meat Act.   That law requires beef69
and other meat from animals to be examined by
federal inspectors for safety.  However, because
MSEP has been declared equivalent to USDA
inspection, U.S. consumers will have no way to
distinguish between Australian meat imports
produced under a highly-privatized inspection
system and domestic meat inspected by U.S.
government employees.  Both products will bear the
USDA’s seal of approval.
For more information on the FSIS equivalence
process, see the report from the USDA’s Office of
Inspector General, located on the Internet at
http://www.usda.gov/oig/auditrpt/full_fsis.pdf. The
FSIS Internet site is at http://www.fsis.usda.gov.
B. NAFTA & Commercial Truck Standards
The transportation annex to NAFTA's Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade set up numerous
harmonization committees and set time lines by
which North American transportation standards
must be harmonized.   A working group organized70
under the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
with numerous industry members, but no public
safety representation, has been developing the U.S.
positions to be taken to on-going international
NAFTA transportation harmonization negotiations.
Given the unbalanced representation of the working
group, it would not be surprising if the new standards
are less protective of public safety and the
environment than current U.S. standards.  
For instance, the maximum weight for commercial
trucks traveling on U.S. interstate is generally 80,000
pounds.  In Mexico, the maximum weight is 171,000
pounds.   Furthermore, according to data from71
Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH),
U.S. trucks on average are 4.5 years old, while
Mexican trucks average 15 years, and U.S. trucks
are required to have front brakes and Anti-Lock
Braking Systems, while Mexican trucks are not
required to have either.   All NAFTA borders were72
to have been opened by December 17, 1995, to
commercial trucks meeting the new harmonized
standards.  However, the DOT denied access to the
U.S. market to Mexican truckers because of
systematic, well-documented safety problems. 
A December 28, 1998, DOT audit of the Federal
Highway Administration’s motor carrier safety
program for commercial trucks at U.S. borders
concluded that “far too few trucks are being
inspected, and that too few inspected trucks comply
with U.S. standards.”   At one border crossing in El73
Paso, Texas, where an average of 1,300 trucks
cross each day, there is only one inspector, who is
able to inspect only 10 to 14 trucks each day.   74
Nevertheless, of the fraction of Mexican trucks that
were inspected, 44 percent were forced out of
service due to serious safety violations.  In contrast,
only 25 percent of U.S. trucks were forced out of
service during the same time period.75
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Given the role played by organizations such as the regulatory system.  Once a foreign system is
American Trucking Association, which has declared “equivalent,” goods meeting its standards
advocated weakening existing U.S. standards, the must be treated as if they met domestic standards,
prospect of harmonized standards which meet the even if there are significant differences between the
higher U.S. standards is unlikely.  Meanwhile, two systems. The goal of the WTO’s equivalence
communities on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican rules is to ensure that goods produced under
border oppose the opening of the border due to equivalent systems are allowed free passage into
environmental and public health threats posed by the each other’s markets.  
additional dangerous trucks.  However, because of
the lack of public input, transparency and Under the proposed organic food regulation, USDA
accountability, these community concerns have no will permit foreign certifying agents to approve foods
role in the harmonization process, where uniformity as “organic” if the foreign government authority that
is the only goal. accredited the certifying agent “acted under an
For more information on NAFTA and commercial explaining this language, the USDA says it will give
trucks, see the Teamsters’ Internet site at “positive consideration to accepting as equivalent the
http://www.teamster.org.  The DOT audit report is technical regulations of other countries even if those
at http://www.oig.dot.gov/audits/tr1999034.html. regulations differ from our own, provided such
C.  Equivalence Language Undermines
USDA Organic Rule
On December 16, 1997, the USDA issued a
proposed rule to establish national standards for
organically-grown foods, to be called the National
Organic Program.   The USDA proposal allowed76
foods produced with genetically-modified organisms,
grown with sewage sludge, and exposed to
irradiation to be labeled as “organic.”
Organic farmers, food cooperatives, and consumers
immediately condemned the rule, flooding the
USDA with over 275,000 comments, the most
USDA has ever received in response to a proposed
rule.  This citizen outcry was effective and the
USDA issued a new draft of the proposed rule on
March 13, 2000, deleting the offending provisions
and addressing many suggestions raised.  77
Almost completely unnoticed in both proposals,
however, was a small section permitting imported
foods to be labeled organic if produced in foreign
countries whose organic standards  are determined
“equivalent” to USDA’s.
Under the WTO’s notion of “equivalence,”
significantly different - possibly less protective -
regulatory systems and standards in other countries
can be declared “equivalent” to a domestic
equivalency agreement with the United States.”  In
regulations fulfil the objectives of this proposed
program.” 
Neither the WTO rules nor the USDA’s proposed
regulation lay out the guidelines to be followed or the
factors to be weighed when determining
equivalence. Lacking such precise criteria, the
organic proposal means that the equivalency decision
will be a subjective judgement on the part of a few
government officials.  
The USDA record so far in making these judgement
calls has been spotty.  In 1999, the USDA declared
the controversial and highly privatized meat
inspection system in Australia as equivalent to that
of the U.S. even though the European Union and
other nations rejected the Australian plan as unsafe.
In the same year, the USDA reaffirmed a Brazilian
meat inspection system as equivalent to our own,
even though at the time many Brazilian meat
inspectors were hired and paid by the meat
processing companies themselves rather than the
government, as required by U.S. law.
The equivalence provisions are particularly troubling
in this context.  The USDA organic proposal
consists of 150 pages of standards and requirements
U.S. food producers must meet before their products
can be labeled “organic.” Many concerned
Americans had a hand in shaping the proposed U.S.
rules.  Yet, the proposal’s loophole permitting vague
equivalency determinations as to what foreign foods
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meet the precise organic standards threatens to which includes companies like Gilette, L’Oreal,
undermine much of the proposal’s progress. Avon, and Johnson & Johnson. 
The purpose of the 1990 Organic Foods Production The record of this meeting includes an interesting
Act, the law requiring USDA to develop the exchange between regulators and industry about the
National Organic Program, was to assure need to include consumers and consumer
“consumers that organically produced products meet representatives in the discussion.  U.S. federal
a consistent standard.”   If USDA recognizes regulators asked industry representatives if they78
foreign systems with different organic accreditation were including consumers in industry harmonization
standards or production requirements as discussions, and the industry representatives
“equivalent,” this Congressional goal will be responded by saying that it really was the regulators’
undermined. job to deal with consumers.  This conversation
Given many people are not aware of the consumers were amongst the highest priority of all
equivalence concept, this undermining element of parties.”
the proposal could slip through.  Those who are
aware have demanded that the USDA strike the Yet, no consumers or consumer groups were even
equivalence language and affirm that no equivalence invited to this meeting.  Only after learning of these
determination will be made regarding core activities in  obscure industry documents have
production requirements. These steps are needed to consumer groups been able to know to demand to be
ensure that all food sold in the U.S., including involved in the discussions. 
imports, meet the requirements of our
democratically-achieved organic food rule.  This is Not surprisingly, CHIC’s tentative agenda tracks
the only way U.S. consumers can be assured that industry demands.  For example, industry wants to
“organic” means organic for both imported and replace the U.S. common-language labeling system,
domestic foods. required by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
For more information on organic agriculture, see the the EU system, U.S. consumers, many of whom
Organic Trade Association’s Internet site at may suffer from serious allergies, would see the
http://www.ota.com, or the USDA’s Internet site at Latin “persicum” instead of “peach” on cosmetics
http://www.ers.usda.gov/whatsnew/issues/organic. labels. 
D. CHIC - Industry Pursues Cosmetics
Harmonization Behind Closed Doors 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)is
developing a new global harmonization body,
tentatively called CHIC (Cosmetic Harmonization
and International Cooperation).  Countries currently
involved in CHIC discussions include the U.S., EU,
Canada, and Japan.
CHIC had its initial meeting in Brussels in April,
1999.  On the invitation list was the U.S.-based
Cosmetics, Toiletry and Fragrance Association
(CTFA), whose members include such multinational
giants as Proctor and Gamble, Almay, Elizabeth
Arden, Clinique, and Colgate.  Also invited was
COLIPA, the European cosmetics trade association,
concluded with the assurance that “the needs of
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with an EU labeling system that is in Latin.  Under
U.S. industry also wants to adopt the EU definition
of “cosmetic,” which would switch some products
currently regulated in the U.S. as “over-the-counter
drugs” to the less-regulated “cosmetics” category.
In addition, U.S. industry wants the FDA to adopt
the EU system of regulating color additives.  The
EU has approved more color additives for use in
cosmetics than the FDA has.  Some of these EU-
approved additives are banned in the U.S. 
If consumers were the driving force in this
discussion, the emphasis would assuredly be
different.  For example, EU regulations require
cosmetic labels to contain batch numbers and
expiration dates and cosmetic companies to keep a
full dossier of information on each product, including
scientific evidence demonstrating efficacy.  U.S.
rules do not.  Thus, the potential for upward
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harmonization of U.S. standards in this area is error, where there is no death or serious injury,
significant.  It will be an interesting experiment to should not be reported.”   This proposal thus would
see if consumer groups can turn the conversation continue to require manufacturers to report use
around to promote upward harmonization of errors that cause death or serious injury, but not use
important cosmetic safety regulations. errors that lead to malfunctions that could cause or
For more information on CHIC, see the FDA’s malfunction recurred.
Office of Cosmetics and Colors Internet site at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/cos-intl.html. Requiring manufacturers to report incidents in this
E. The GHTF - Weakening Medical
Device Regulations
The Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) was
established in 1992 to harmonize medical device
regulatory systems and facilitate trade.  It is
comprised of government health officials and
industry representatives from Australia, Canada, the
European Union, Japan, and the U.S.  Consumer
groups are excluded.
On August 5, 1999, the Food and Drug
Administration, which participates in the GHTF,
published a draft document prepared by the GHTF -
“Proposal for Reporting of Use Errors with Medical
Devices” - to serve as a reference for industry on
adverse event reporting.   Under current81
regulations, the FDA requires medical device
manufacturers to report to the agency information
“that reasonably suggests that a device marketed by
the manufacturer: (1) May have caused or
contributed to a death or serious injury; or (2) Has
malfunctioned and such device or similar device
marketed by the manufacturer would be likely to
cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if Because Codex standards are named in both
the malfunction were to recur.” NAFTA and the WTO as the presumptively legal82
The phrase “cause or contribute” is defined under domestic standard which provides greater
the regulations as an event that may occur as a restrictions on pesticide residues could face a trade
result of six different factors, one of which is “user challenge.
error.”   Thus, user errors that lead to malfunctions83
that could cause or contribute to a death or serious Yet Codex still allows DDT residues in milk, meat
injury if the malfunction were to recur must be and grains.  Until Public Citizen publicized Codex's
reported under current FDA regulations. DDT standards in 1993, Codex also allowed DDT
The GHTF proposal, which applies only to user Citizen joined with the scientists of the
errors (renamed “use errors” in the proposal), is a Environmental Working Group to study the relative
significant departure from FDA regulations.  Under strength of U.S. and Codex standards.  Until this
the GHTF proposal, “Adverse events involving use study was conducted, the only information
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contribute to death or serious injury if the
second category is critical.  The entire purpose of
the device reporting requirements is to prevent
future adverse events.  Yet, under the GHTF
proposal, important adverse events deemed by the
manufacturer to be due to “use error” could continue
to accumulate and not be reported to the FDA until
deaths or serious injuries resulted.  The GHTF
proposal does not even deign to provide a
justification for this radical departure from current
practices.  
If finalized and adopted by the FDA, the GHTF
proposal would significantly weaken current FDA
standards and fray the safety net for U.S. patients.
Fortunately, the GHTF is reconsidering the proposal
after Public Citizen’s Health Research Group
intervened and wrote a letter to the FDA protesting
the proposal.85
For more information on the GHTF, see the GHTF
Internet site at http://www.ghtf.org.
F. Harmonizing Standards for
Carcinogenic Pesticide Residues in Food  
food standards for international commerce, any
residues on fruits and vegetables. In 1993, Public
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comparing  U.S. and Codex standards was a
Government Accounting Office study noting that in
55 percent of cases compared, U.S. standards
provided more consumer protection than Codex
standards.   86
Codex lists specific levels of allowable pesticide
residues and allowable additives such as colors,
flavors and preservatives for specific foods. The
Environmental Working Group's scientists found that
of the 3,285 pesticide/crop combinations for which
Codex has standards, 1,539 are barred by the U.S.
Similarly, the U.S. has rules banning residues of 40
pesticides for which Codex provides 569 different
standards. Eight of these barred active pesticide
ingredients allowed by Codex are rated as highly
hazardous by the World Health Organization.  Yet,
Codex provides for 116 food tolerances for such
pesticide residues.   As the report emphasized, any87
decline in guaranteed public health protections that
downward food standard harmonization could cause
would be disproportionately borne by poor
consumers who do not have the extra income to
“choose” safer food by buying organic produce.
On April 7, 2000, EPA published a Notice (which is
the EPA’s version of a Proposed Rule), in which
the agency proposed to amend its tolerances for the
pesticide “avermectin” (or “abamectin”) to
harmonize them with Codex tolerances.   EPA88
originally set avermectin tolerances for tomatoes
and bell peppers at .01 parts per million (ppm) and
for head lettuce and celery at .05 ppm.89
However, on September 7, 1999, EPA doubled its
avermectin tolerance for all peppers to .02 ppm in
order to harmonize with the Codex tolerance.90
Based on information submitted by Novartis Crop
Protection, Inc., the manufacturer of avermectin,
EPA is proposing to lump tomatoes, peppers, and
other “fruiting” vegetables into one category with a
tolerance of .02 ppm; and head lettuce, celery, and
other “leafy” vegetables into one category with a
tolerance of .10 ppm.   This will effectively double91
EPA’s current tolerances for tomatoes, head
lettuce, and celery.
For more information on Codex, see the Codex
Internet site at http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/
ECONOMIC/esn/codex/default.htm.
G. The U.S.-EU Mutual Recognition
Agreement
  
On May 18, 1998, the U.S. and the European
Commission signed a Mutual Recognition
Agreement affecting trade in billions of dollars worth
of products between the U.S. and European Union
member nations.   An MRA is a reciprocal92
agreement between countries requiring them to treat
each other’s “conformity assessment” procedures as
if they were their own.  “Conformity assessment”
means verification by a country that a product meets
a required standard.  Thus conformity assessment
systems include product testing, quality systems
audits, and reporting of analysis of such tests and
audits.  
The 1998 U.S.-EU MRA consists of a general
framework (the “umbrella agreement”) and six
sectoral annexes covering telecommunications,
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety,
recreational craft safety, medical devices, and
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices
(GMPs).  Good manufacturing practices ensure the
purity and the quality of the finalized drug product.
The purpose of the pharmaceutical GMP Annex is
to permit European drug regulatory authorities to
conduct GMP inspections in their nations on behalf
of the FDA.  To achieve this, the FDA will examine
the pharmaceutical GMP regulatory systems of each
of the 15 EU nations and determine whether each is
equivalent to the U.S. regulatory system.  Once the
FDA declares a nation’s GMPs equivalent, nations
will be able to export drugs to the U.S. without
having to submit them for inspection by the FDA.  
The FDA began assessing the equivalence of EU
member nations in October 1999 and expects to
finish by August 2001.  The General Accounting
Office has estimated that the FDA will require at
least $10 million including 125 full-time employees to
implement this aspect of the MRA.93
The GMP Annex defines “equivalence” as involving
“systems [that] are sufficiently comparable to assure
that the process of inspection and the ensuing
inspection reports will provide adequate information
to determine whether respective statutory and
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regulatory requirements of the authorities have been (“UHT”) milk was exported from Quebec to Puerto
fulfilled.  Equivalence does not require that the Rico.  Under pressure from the Food and Drug
respective regulatory systems have identical Administration for its lax hygiene standards
procedures.”   regarding milk, in 1990 Puerto Rico adopted the94
While the FDA has stressed that the MRA does not Conference on Interstate Milk Shipments (NCIMS)
mean that standards would be harmonized, at a which subjects the milk industry to strict sanitation
December 8, 1999 meeting on the topic, one FDA standards, practices and inspection.  The UHT milk
official stated, “There is certainly no prohibition did not comply with these new rules. Quebec
against certain harmonizations taking place.  I think refused either to participate in the NCIMS or to
it’s just a natural outcome of the process.” contract with a northern U.S. state to conduct the95
Consumer groups are concerned about the MRA Puerto Rico banned imports of UHT milk at the end
for a variety of reasons. The FDA has indicated of 1991.  
that it will not solicit public comment before making
each equivalence determination and that the Canada then demanded a study to assess the
governing body which will determine equivalence “equivalence” of pasteurized and non-pasteurized
will operate behind closed doors. (This stands in UHT milk under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
stark contrast to the FDA’s procedure on the Agreement which contains provisions similar to
equivalency of food systems which allows for early NAFTA’s. The two countries could not agree on the
notice and comment on a tentative declaration of parameters of the study, and Canada filed a formal
equivalence.) In addition, consumers will have no trade challenge.  In June 1993, the panel concluded
access to the correspondence, comparative memos that Puerto Rico had not violated any specific terms
and documents that led to the equivalence decision of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
until after a positive declaration of equivalence is However, the panel ruled against the United Stated
made. If the FDA rejects an equivalence decision, anyway, deciding that the prohibition on UHT
documents will remain sealed. imports “nullified and impaired” benefits Canada
Moreover, U.S. consumer groups have expressed trade agreement.
concern about whether documents currently   
available to the U.S. public under the Freedom of The panel specifically concluded that, in light of the
Information Act (FOIA) would remain so once the pact’s equivalency provisions, Canada had a
FDA turns over its inspection duties to foreign reasonable expectation that a product, like UHT
regulators. Few EU countries have a law similar to milk, which had been sold in the U.S. for some time,
FOIA, and not all EU countries publish recall would not be excluded from the market because of
information like the U.S. does.  FDA officials have adoption of a new U.S. standard if it could be shown
even indicated that the agency might use the that the product was being produced under standards
“national security information” exemption  to FOIA having the same effect as the new U.S. standard.96
if it needed to keep certain business information  
confidential. Puerto Rico was allowed to keep out UHT milk
For more information on the U.S.-EU MRA, see the issue.  However, in 1996, Puerto Rico was required
MRA Internet site at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/mra/ to accept imports of Canadian UHT milk.   In fact,
index.html. after implementing the trade ruling, Puerto Rico
H. When Are Pasteurized and Non-
Pasteurized Milk Equivalent?
From 1977 through 1991, ultra-high temperature
Pasteurized Milk Ordinance and joined the National
required milk inspections and certifications. Thus,
reasonably expected would accrue to it under the
97
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while negotiations continued over how to resolve the
99
accepted so much Canadian UHT milk that on
March 17, 1997, a Puerto Rican milk producer filed
antidumping petitions with the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the U.S. International Trade
Commission against Canadian producers of UHT
milk.   The petition claims Canadian producers sold100
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UHT milk in Puerto Rico for less than fair market specific determination of equivalency proposed by
value and requests an Antidumping Order against industry on a specific standard. 
imports of Canadian UHT milk.101
I. Auto Safety Standards Go Global 
The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) has signed onto a 1998
Global Auto Agreement that will create a new (as
yet unnamed) international institution for setting the
WTO-legal standards for automobiles and auto
safety standards in Geneva. The 1998 Agreement
will go into force as soon as it is signed by eight
countries, likely in the summer of 2000.  Auto102
safety experts in the U.S. have lobbied against the
agreement citing the lack of specific consumer
benefits ascribed to harmonization, the democracy
deficit that ensues when U.S. standards are
negotiated overseas and concerns about the drain on
NHTSA’s scarce resources.
The global auto body empowered by the 1998
Agreement will be unlike most standard setting
organizations. The body will operate by consensus,
and each nation must attempt to adopt each
approved standard into domestic law. (In contrast,
while Codex standards have standing under the
WTO, and thus can be used to challenge higher
domestic standards, they are technically “voluntary”
and do not have to be adopted domestically by the
nations involved.) 
Critical reductions in safety can result from changes
in technical details of U.S. safety standards.
NHTSA’s early experience with international
harmonization has not been good. In 1995, NHTSA
adopted an EU standard that would allow brake
status to be checked by a manual push button rather
than requiring automatic brake status checks  and103
NHTSA allowed European parts maintenance and
replacement practices for headlamps that are less
economical and less effective at illuminating U.S.
road signs.104
However, in 1999, NHTSA rejected two industry
proposed “equivalency” determinations.  Unlike105
other federal agencies, when NHTSA determines
equivalency, it is not looking at a broad definition of
equivalency between regulatory agencies, but a very
For example, NHTSA rejected an American
Automobile Manufacturers Association request to
amend two federal motor vehicle safety standards,
one on windshield wiping and washing and another
on windshield defrosting and defogging, and to
determine corresponding EU standards “functionally
equivalent.” NHTSA made its decision after
determining that the EU standards would result in
sizeable reduction in the area cleared by the wipers
and the defoggers, reducing visibility and providing
less safety. However NHTSA did say it believes a
harmonized standard is possible and it will continue
to work on the issue with EU colleagues.
In an April 2000 meeting, NHTSA officials
conceded to auto safety experts that the standards
set in the new Geneva-based harmonization body
would qualify as the presumptively-legal WTO
standards, and that other standards the U.S. might
develop outside this forum could be challenged as
technical barriers to trade in the WTO dispute
resolution system. In fact, NHTSA said it pushed for
the agreement because it did not want to see a
similar European auto standard setting body, which
operates under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, to set the official
WTO-legal standards. Ironically, the European group
will still continue to meet and promulgate harmonized
standards for the EU. 
While the proposal for a new global auto body poses
many challenges for public interest groups and U.S.
consumers who will find it hard to attend meetings in
Geneva and track the progress of any standard, the
same situation presents industry with an interesting
array of new options. The dual venues for auto
standards create an interesting situation where
industry could try to play one forum off of the other,
or forum shop for the more amenable institution. If,
for example, the U.S. blocks the development of a
global auto standard under the 1998 Agreement that
NHTSA believes would unacceptably lower existing
U.S. standards, industry could try and get the same
standards passed in the European auto standards
body, thus placing the higher U.S. standard at risk
for a WTO challenge as a technical barrier to trade.
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For more information on auto safety standards transportation systems, the U.S., the EU, Canada
harmonization, see the United Nations’ Economic and the U.N. transportation system. U.S. OSHA
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Internet site at currently chairs the IOMC. Once completed, the
http://www.unece.org/trans/main/welcwp29.htm. GHS will be permanently housed at the United
For more information on harmonization of other Nations Economic and Social Council.
types of transportation safety standards, see
http://www.unece.org/trans/Welcome.html. While gains in efficiency and worker safety could
J. Creating a Global System for
Chemical Classifications and Labeling
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the United Nations (U.N.) and
no less than ten U.S. federal agencies have been
involved in a decade long effort to create a Globally
Harmonized System (GHS) for chemical
classification and labeling.  The definition of
“chemicals” for the negotiations includes pesticides,
pharmaceuticals and consumer products. This
international harmonization effort will result in a
system that will have profound effects on U.S.
regulations regarding worker, consumer and
environmental protections, the transportation of
hazardous materials, and community right-to-know
laws.
Four different international agencies have a piece of
the GHS pie. The OECD has primary responsibility,
through a series of expert committees, for
classifying acute health hazards (such as irritation,
sensitization and acute toxicity), chronic health
hazards (such as carcinogenicity and reproductive
toxicity) and environmental hazards. The U.N.
Committee on the Transport of Dangerous Goods,
which already has a set of international rules
governing the transportation of hazardous materials,
is charged with developing further rules on
transportation and physical hazards, including
flammability and reactivity (explosion hazard). The
ILO is responsible for information systems, including
rules regarding labeling and material safety data
sheets. 
Overall coordination of the entire harmonized
system is provided by the Inter-organization
Programme for the Sound Management of
Chemicals (IOMC) which includes representatives
from the four relevant chemical classifications and
accrue from a GHS on chemicals and while diligent
union representatives have worked hard to monitor
the negotiations and to promote upward
harmonization, critics cite three concerns. 
First, many important battles have been fought in ten
years of negotiations, and many more years of
negotiations are still planned. By the time the GHS
is implemented in the U.S. (likely via half a dozen
large Federal Register notices posted by the federal
agencies involved), crucial issues will already have
been decided.  These issues include the definition of
“acute toxicity,” rules governing mixtures and alloys,
and whether those preferring the worker-protective
“hazard-based” labeling will prevail over those
preferring a “risk-based” labeling system, which
provides a lesser level of worker protection,. The
ability of public interest organizations, labor unions,
or public health officials to impact those decisions so
late in the game will be minimal.
Second, once in place and adopted by many nations
and thousands of manufacturers, the system will be
extraordinarily difficult to modify. As currently
constituted, it is not clear how the GHS will
incorporate change as new science presents new
evidence of hazard. In addition, the negotiators have
yet to decide how to handle corporate “trade secret”
claims, raising the fear that chemical suppliers will
be able to claim business confidentiality with regard
to certain information, and thus nullifying the
information requirements at the core of the
agreement.
Finally,  labor representatives involved in the GHS
lost a battle to turn the results of harmonization talks
into a binding international convention. This means
that there will be no capacity to sanction countries
for violating the standards or having lower standards.
However, the dispute resolution system of the WTO
will stand ready to enforce the GHS as the
presumptively-legal international standard. Should
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any nation adopt worker safety protections that term animal studies.
exceed those in the GHS, they could be subject to
challenge as an unfair barrier to trade in the WTO. The U.S. also has a role in lowering other nations’
For more information on the GHS, see standards. For example, the U.S. is trying to push its
http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/harmonization. use of placebos in clinical trials onto other countries
K. The ICH - Weakening U.S.
Carcinogenicity Testing Standards 
The International Conference on Harmonization of
Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was
created by industry and regulatory authorities to
harmonize requirements for the production and
registration of pharmaceuticals in the U.S., EU, and
Japan.  The ICH is comprised of three
governmental bodies - the European Commission,
Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, and U.S.
Center for Drug and Biologics Evaluation and
Research (an office of the FDA) - and three
pharmaceutical industry trade associations - the
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries
Association, Japanese Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, and Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America.  Again,
consumer groups are excluded.
In 1996, the FDA proposed changes to the
guidelines for testing the potential carcinogenicity of
pharmaceuticals.  These proposed changes are now
under active consideration.  The purpose of these106
proposed changes was to harmonize U.S. standards
with those promoted by the ICH.  
Previously, the U.S. required companies to test new
drugs on two species, typically mice and rats.
Testing on two animal species offers more
assurance in assessing the risk to humans than
testing on only one species. The most accurate
predictor of carcinogenicity is the rat-mouse
combination. For instance, for 65 substances, tests
in rats alone have failed to produce evidence of
carcinogenicity, while additional tests on mice have
yielded clear evidence. Yet, the proposal for a
harmonized testing standard allows pharmaceutical
companies to drop mice tests and substitute short-
term tests for a second species test, even though
short-term tests are less indicative than the longer-
107
standards by pushing U.S. policy into international
through the ICH.
On September 24, 1999, the FDA published a Draft
Guidance on Choice of Control Group in Clinical
Trials (“The Guidance”), which was prepared by the
ICH.   About ICH guidelines, the FDA says,108
“Although [ICH] guideline[s do] not create or confer
any rights for or on any person and [do] not operate
to bind FDA, [they do] represent the agency’s
current thinking.”109
The Guidance attacks active-controlled trials, in
which a new drug’s effects are compared to the
effects of drugs that have already been approved
and are on the market, and advocates the use of
placebo-controlled trials, in which a new drug’s
effects are compared to the effects of a placebo.  In
an active-controlled trial the test group is given the
new drug and the control group is given a drug that
has been approved as safe and effective.  In a
placebo-controlled trial, the test group is given the
new drug, but the control group is merely given a
placebo.
Experts have criticized the FDA’s reliance on
placebo-controlled trials as  uninformative and
unethical.  For example, in a letter to the FDA
protesting the Guidance, Public Citizen’s Health
Research Group stated, “Most patients and
physicians have little need for information addressing
whether a new drug for a disease for which there
already is an effective therapy is better than nothing;
they would like to know whether the new drug is
better than the existing drug.”   110
Furthermore, the letter continues, “The Guidance is
a transparent attempt to legitimize evasions of the
clear requirements of the Declaration of Helsinki,
which requires that ‘in any medical study, every
patient - including those of a control group, if any -
should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and
therapeutic method.”   The letter concludes,111
“While this may make things easier for regulatory
bodies, which can approve drugs simply on the basis
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of superiority to placebo, and to the pharmaceutical consumers’ concerns over GMOs’ possible health
industry, which can more easily prove a new drug and environmental risks, has restricted the domestic
superior to placebo than approximately equivalent to use of genetically-modified seeds and import and
a known effective treatment, patients will often not sale of products made with GMOs.  Other nations,
receive optimal medical treatment during the following the EU’s lead, have required pre-market
trial.” testing and labeling of GMOs and foods made with112
By controlling ICH discussions, and excluding any special testing or approval in the U.S.  U.S.
consumer groups from these discussions, the consumers are not even informed of the presence of
pharmaceutical industry’s goal seems clear: paving GMOs in their food given U.S. law does not require
the way for new drug approvals worldwide with as GMO labeling.
little testing as possible.
For more information on the ICH, see the ICH Biosafety Protocol negotiations because it never
Internet site at http://www.ifpma.org/ich1.html. ratified the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity,
L.  U.S. Weakens GMO Regulations in
International Negotiations
On January 29, 2000, in Montreal, Canada,
representatives from 131 nations, including the U.S.,
agreed to a biosafety protocol that establishes rules
for international trade in genetically-modified
organisms (GMOs).  The agreement, referred to as
the “Cartagena Biosafety Protocol” because the
first such negotiations took place in Cartagena,
Columbia in 1999, will not take effect until at least
fifty nations ratify it.
The agreement’s conclusion was heralded by both
industry and citizen activists, highlighting the
ambiguity of the pact’s language and the varying
interpretations of its significance.  Activists lauded
the Protocol as the first international agreement to
set binding global regulations on a global industry
and as promoting the Precautionary Principle, which
states that nations should take protective action
when faced with uncertain risks or inconclusive
scientific evidence.  Notably the Protocol does not
use the words “Precautionary Principle.”  Rather it
outlines the steps nations may take in a
“precautionary approach” to regulating GMOs.
Industry promoted the Protocol as being of limited
scope and subject to World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules.
These negotiations took place in the context of an
intensifying  fight between the U.S. and EU over
GMO regulation and trade.  The EU, in response to
GMOs.   In contrast, GMO products do not require113
The U.S. was unable to participate officially in the
which is the basis for the biosafety talks.  However,
the U.S. was able to influence the negotiations
significantly as a vocal observer and through other
nations, like Canada and Australia, that have ratified
the Convention on Biological Diversity.  These
countries’ aims for international trade in GMOs
parallel the U.S.’s.  The U.S. is the largest exporter
of GM foods, but both Canada and Australia export
billions of dollars worth of GM foods as well.
In February 1999, the “Miami Group” - consisting of
the major food exporting countries Canada,
Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and the U.S. -
blocked the adoption of a biosafety protocol during
negotiations in Cartagena by refusing to allow
commodities, like soybeans and corn, to be included
in the agreement.   According to a statement from114
the European Commission, “This would in practice
mean excluding 99 percent of the genetically
modified organisms that the protocol is supposed to
cover.”   An estimated fifty percent of the U.S.115
soybean crop and thirty-three percent of the U.S.
corn crop is grown with GM seeds.116
The U.S. finally stopped blocking the protocol in
Montreal, but only after obtaining several
concessions.   Most significantly, the U.S. obtained
language that obscures the Protocol’s legal standing
relative to the WTO’s Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement).  The U.S. wanted the Protocol to be
subject to the SPS Agreement because these WTO
rules prohibit nations from maintaining food safety
regulations, including those governing GMOs, that
are not based on scientific findings of specific human
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1.  Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XXIV-12 in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
2.  Also, the Agreement on Government Procurement, one of several plurilateral agreements completed in
conjunction with the GATT Uruguay Round, forbids procurement set-asides aimed at providing beneficial terms for
minority or small businesses. (Agreement on Government Procurement, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), Article
XVI-1.) Such procurement set-asides exist in current U.S. law and the European Union has similar provisions to
promote development in economically distressed regions.
3. Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) ¶ 9, in Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15,
1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994). 
4. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 11, 16-23. Even where a higher level of protection is permissible, the standard, on its face and as
applied, must comply with all of the other WTO requirements to pass muster under WTO.
health risks.  This effectively eviscerates use of the Deciding whether the Protocol is subject to WTO
Precautionary Principle.  The SPS Agreement also rules will be a difficult and politically-charged
does not allow nations to consider other legitimate process.  Such a decision may be forced if a nation’s
factors, such as environmental implications and laws regulating trade in GMOs are ever challenged
consumer opinions, in setting standards. at the WTO.  Significantly, however, if a nation does
According to U.S. Department of Agriculture WTO tribunal, it is WTO trade bureaucrats, not the
officials, the U.S. got what it wanted.  At the environmental, food safety, and consumer experts or
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue conference in groups that helped to shape the Biosafety Protocol,
Washington, D.C., February 2000, Bernice Slutsky who will be making that critical decision.
of the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service,
informed a consumer group audience that the U.S. The Biosafety Protocol is available on the Internet at
believes that the Protocol does not change nations’ http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol.
WTO rights and obligations.
challenge another nation’s GMO regulations in a
CONCLUSION
Reforming the practices of international institutions overshadowed by focus on globalization’s economic
like NAFTA and the WTO, if ever possible, is a effects.
long-term goal.  Providing consumer, environmental,
health and other broad public interest balance in At a minimum, U.S. regulators must fully apply the
even the quasi-governmental harmonization due process and participation requirements of
agencies, like Codex, is limited by the structures of existing U.S. laws, such as the Administrative
these organizations. Yet, the current trade-related Procedure Act, Freedom of Information Act, and
proposals for harmonization and equivalence and Federal Advisory Committee Act, to all international
organizations such as ISO and Codex will have far- harmonization activities.  Development of U.S.
reaching implications not only for strong substantive positions taken to harmonization talks and
U.S. standards, but also on the process of open, consideration of any other proposals coming out of
accountable standard-setting in the U.S.. Clearly, such negotiations must be through the on-the-record
the latter raises major issues about maintaining system of notice-and-comment rulemaking, as
democratic and accountable governance in the era required by the APA.  To date, adherence to these
of globalization that to date have been existing legal requirements has been spotty, at best.
NOTES
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5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) ¶¶ 2.4, 5.4. in Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9, (1994);
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, ¶ 905-1, North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992.
6. TBT Agreement, Arts. 2-4, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
7.  Codex is a quasi-governmental commission based in Rome that sets food standards through a process involving
a large role for industry, but little involvement of public health or consumer interests.  Codex is discussed at length
later in this handbook. 
8.  For instance, the WTO requires one of the following professional backgrounds to qualify for its roster of
potential tribunalists: having served on or presented a case to the GATT panel, having represented a government at
GATT, having worked in the Secretariat of GATT, having served as a senior trade policy official of a GATT Member,
or having taught or published articles on international trade law or policy. (Agreement Establishing the WTO, Art. 8-
1, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9
(1994)). Thus, the world's leading expert on air quality regardless of numerous advanced degrees, publications, and
high-level experience, would not be qualified under WTO rules to sit on a WTO case judging a country's air
standards.
9. WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art. 8.1.
10.  The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding specifically mandates that all dispute panel activities and
documents are confidential.  See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Art. 14 and App. 3, Paras. 2 and 3.  NAFTA’s Rules of Procedure state that the dispute “panel’s hearings,
deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and communications with the panel shall be
confidential.”  North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 2012.1(b).
11.  In mid-1996, Public Citizen and the Sierra Club Legal Defense and Education Fund sent an unsolicited amicus
submission to the WTO in support of the European ban of certain artificial hormones in beef. The U.S. had filed a
WTO case against the European hormone ban.  The ban is supported by U.S. consumer groups and is considered a
cutting-edge public health measure.  Thus, the case has significant public health and democratic governance
implications.  Not only was the amicus submission rejected, but the WTO staff actually mailed the large package
containing the brief back to the United States from Geneva. Attached was a sharp-toned note about the WTO's
policy of not accepting outside submissions. The WTO dispute resolution staff had not returned a past unsolicited
amicus submission the two groups made on an earlier WTO case with major environmental implications.  Top WTO
officials were concerned that failing to return the next submission might create expectations that outside
submissions were appropriate or allowed.  The WTO dispute panel eventually ruled the artificial hormone ban an
illegal trade barrier.
12. WTO, “United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” Report of the Appellate
Body, Oct. 12, 1998, at 35-36.
13.  This elaborate trade advisory committee system is established at the 1974 Trade Acts (19 U.S.C. § 2155).
14.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Land Transportation Subcommittee, Annex 913.5.9-1, North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992.
15. See 56 Fed. Reg. 29050-51 (Jun. 25, 1991), describing the formal role of industry advisors to Codex.
16. National Food Alliance, Cracking the Codex: An Analysis of Who Sets World Food Standards (1993) at 1.  As a
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